The Lockheed Hudson

The traumatic effect WWII had on individuals and families is self-evident. Many companies were also deeply affected — negatively and positively. Some, such as Brewster, were so ineptly managed that they could not survive the rigors of fast changing technology and greatly expanded production rates. Although the giant Curtiss-Wright survived as a corporate entity by retreating to other endeavors, its once-proud name would not appear on any successful postwar airplane design. For others blessed with sound management and engineering capability, it was an opportunity to expand and rise to the challenge. Lockheed was fortunate to have been one of the latter.

The year 1938 was on the threshold of this traumatic period, and it was a year of considerable opportunity for Lockheed. While it would be nearly three years before U.S. involvement, WWII was imminent in Europe. The British and French governments were especially concerned that their home industries could not keep up with their defense needs if war did break out. The U.S. aircraft industry was the world leader in airline type airplanes, but it had not generally kept up with the latest developments in military airplanes. Nevertheless, it was considered to have the potential for both quantity and quality in such airplanes. Accordingly, both governments turned to the U.S. that year to supplement their home production.

The British Purchasing Commission arrived in the U.S. in April prepared to spend millions of dollars for American warplanes. Although Lockheed was a small manufacturer of airliners, it was included in the commission’s itinerary because the British believed a military version of the Super Electra might be useful as a navigational trainer. Lockheed had other ideas. As reported on August 29, 1937, by the New York Times, use of the Super Electra as a bomber had been considered during its original design. Lockheed was, therefore, not at a loss for ideas when the pending visit of the British team was announced. What it lacked was something concrete in the form of a mockup to show the British how it could be done. In lieu of the three months typically required, Lockheed craftsmen worked feverishly day and night to complete a wooden mockup in 10 days.

The British team was quite impressed with the potential of the Super Electra as a bomber. Minor changes in equipment location were suggested, and the team was further impressed with Lockheed’s ability to incorporate them in the mockup overnight. As the British team did not have the authority to sign contracts, Lockheed was invited to London for further negotiations. The importance of the British contract to Lockheed was evidenced by the composition of the team that traveled to London—Courtland Gross, Carl Squier, Kelly Johnson, Richard A. Von Hake, and a contracts expert named Bob Proctor. After two months of negotiations, the British Air Ministry finally signed the $25 million contract on June 23, 1938. The successful operation of Electras by British Airways and the pending delivery of its Super Electras were undoubtedly very positive factors in the negotiations.

The British purchase of American airplanes wasn’t met with enthusiasm by everyone. C.C. Grey, editor of the British Aeroplane, was vehemently critical. This was not unusual since Grey was critical of all American airplanes and frequently engaged in wars of words with his American counterparts. Regardless of whether he was prompted by perceived logic or just prejudice, history would prove him decidedly wrong. The war conditions became so grave that the home industry could not have produced enough warplanes to resist the Nazi aggression!

The British order, the largest ever placed with an American manufacturer at that time, was for 200 airplanes with an added incentive — the British would take as many as could be delivered by December 1939, up to a maximum of 250. Because the airplanes . . .