Crushing America by Air

[Editor’s Note: Many are aware that Gen. William “Billy” Mitchell was court-martialed in 1925 for his outspoken position regarding air power. Many are also aware that he accurately predicted the war with Japan, the attack of the Hawaiian Islands and the importance that air power would play in future conflicts. At the time many of these ideas were scoffed at by senior commanders. Few of us have had the opportunity to see firsthand what General Mitchell was actually espousing. The following article is the second in a series General Mitchell wrote for Aeronautics magazine in 1929, others of which will be presented in future issues.]

Every airplane built is an asset for national defense. Each and every one, no matter whether it is called military or commercial, can be used in wartime, either for actual
combat or transportation of goods and material, or for the training of pilots. Every air mechanic employed on commercial airways is efficient in case of war. Every airway, every landing field, all the aids to aerial navigation and the weather service, are assets.

The tremendous military value of air power has burst on the world so suddenly that its realization is difficult for the average citizen. The idea is deeply ingrained into most of us that armies and navies must always conduct our wars, because they have done so from time immemorial. Such, however, is by no means the case today.

The army has lost its mobility and with it the power of effecting a quick decision. To bring a war to a successful conclusion, the vital points of the enemy must be seized or
controlled, so as to prevent him from living in his accustomed way and carrying on his usual functions of government. Armies were opposed by other armies in the accomplishment of this task. In other words, walls of men were put up in front of the great cities and vital centers to protect them. In the days when populations were not as great per square mile as now, and it was difficult to support armies, the small forces employed were capable of considerable movement, but as time went on the armies grew larger and larger, became more immobile and unwieldy, and incapable of striking or acting quickly. The distance from Washington to Richmond, Va., is 121 miles. In the Civil War, it took the Union Army about five years to get there. An airplane would have covered the distance in less than one hour. In the European war, the armies faced each other along a 250 mile front. They went backward and forward for about 60 miles until the end of the contest. Men were killed by the thousands by machine gun fire, they were shot up with cannon, stuck with bayonets and devoured by disease. This modern and “humane” warfare could only result in one thing, the utter destruction of all the participants in such a combat. It ceased to be war and was merely a slaughterhouse performance in which no science, art or ingenuity was involved. The European war, except for a few battles at the beginning, was one of the most uninteresting that history gives us. Armies have now reached a stalemate and the old theory of war, that victory meant the destruction of the hostile main army, is untenable. The idea behind this was that once the army was destroyed, all the vital centers of the opposing country lay open to the invader. Now, however, armies have become mere holders of ground and air power is the only thing that can go quickly and surely to the vital centers of the enemy. If you tie aviation to an army you are going to stop its effectiveness at once.

Suppose, for instance, that Chicago and New York were the capitals and vital centers of two opposing states. They are about 800 miles apart. Suppose that the military force of Chicago consisted of a great army of one million men with only aviation enough to act as a means of reconnaissance and observation for its infantry and artillery. Suppose that the army of New York consisted of 100,000 men but that they had an air force of 1,000 airplanes capable of flying to Chicago and back, and each capable of carrying two tons of projectiles, air torpedoes, bombs, gas projecting apparatus and guns. Suppose this force were launched at Chicago, with 2,000 tons of projectiles. They would make the trip in seven hours. They could not only force the evacuation of the city and set on fire all the towns and manufacturing plants around . . .