The Shoot Down of Sun Valley 56-0528

On September 2, 1958, a Lockheed C-130A-II transport was shot down by four Soviet MiG 17 fighters over Nerkin Sasnashen, Soviet Armenia, resulting in the loss of the aircraft and 17 crewmembers. The U.S. State Department (State) condemned the attack on an unarmed U.S. military transport as “without regard to the rules of civilized international practice” and followed with a statement that the aircraft was “on a world-wide U.S. Air Force mission to study the propagation of radio waves transmitted by U.S. radio stations.”1 However, as facts were later to prove, this was the beginning of an odyssey of intentional dissembling and prevarication by the U.S. government that continues to this day.

The United States since before WWII has been engaged in what is broadly known as Signal Intelligence (SIGNET) gathering against actual or perceived hostile countries. SIGNET,2 a term coined by the National Security Agency (NSA), is further subdivided into Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) and Communication Intelligence (COMINT). ELINT deals with all electromagnetic radiation other than voice, while COMINT in 1958, dealt exclusively with voice/code communications.

Because of the multiple duplication of signals collection by military commands, Congress in the mid 1950s pushed to have the NSA to have responsibility for all signals collection.3 The beginning of the Cold War focused these efforts on the Soviet Union, its large geographical expanse and dearth of land lines, made it particularly vulnerable to SIGNET operations. Soviet air defense radar sites communicating over long distances between control centers necessitated the use of encrypted high frequency (HF 3-30 MHz) radio and Morse code that was vulnerable to interception and decryption.

Timely collection and analysis is essential and aircraft with their greater mobility are particularly suited for ELINT/COMINT. The Lockheed C-130 with its exceptional endurance and voluminous cargo bay, has been an ideal collection platform allowing equipment, analysts and support personnel to function as an integrated unit. Furthermore, lumbering cargo aircraft present the least provocative profile in the event of interception by enemy aircraft.

Under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force Security Command, the air arm of the NSA, aircraft conducted flights known as Flight Wolf along Soviet borders and on some occasions intentionally penetrated the Soviet airspace.4 These SIGNET operations covered a large electromagnetic spectrum from high frequency radio to microwave radar emissions. This collection contributed greatly to the understanding Soviet of air defense units state of readiness, air activity, reaction times, enemy order of battle, ground control intercept frequencies, signal strength, locations and weaknesses, all which were vital to the conduct of future military operations.

In 1957, the U.S. Air Force Security Services, contracted with the Texas Engineering and Manufacturing Company (TEMCO) to modify 10 new Lockheed C-130As to replace the aging Boeing RB-50G HAYSTACK SIGNET aircraft both of which were organized under the BIG FIVE program.5 The aircraft were flown direct from Lockheed’s Marietta, Ga., production line to Majors Field, Greenville, Tex., for modification as part of the previously established Airborne Communication Reconnaissance Program (ACRP). The following aircraft known as Sun Valley I’s, underwent modifications: 56-0484, c/n 3092; 56-0525, c/n 3133;, 56-0528, c/n 3136; 56-0530, c/n 3138; . . .