

MARYLAND AIR COMMANDOS

Special Air Warfare in the
Air National Guard
1963–1975

by Lt. Col. Merle T. Cole

This paper examines the relatively unknown field of “special air warfare” (SAW), a term encompassing the air aspects of counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, and psychological operations.¹ U.S. Air Force (USAF) activity in the secretive field known as special operations is much lower key than U.S. Army Special Forces (Green Berets). After a review of SAW history and USAF doctrine, this paper will focus on SAW participation by Air National Guard units.

The French and British air forces have some claim to originating SAW, since both engaged in agent infiltration and other unconventional operations as early as World War I.² USAF special operations (SO) forces trace their roots to World War II. There were two very distinct arenas: exploitation of the guerrilla warfare, sabotage, espionage and psychological warfare potential of resistance movements which sprang up in the Axis-occupied territories; and support of special military units operating in the enemy’s rear areas.

Both the British Special Operations Executive and the



American Office of Strategic Service (OSS) sought to “set Europe ablaze” by controlling resistance movements. This involved activities ranging from supply of arms and ammunition to existing bands, to insertion of “Jedburgh” intelligence teams and OSS Operational Groups. (The latter—which armed, trained and led guerrilla units—were the model for the early Green Beret organizations.) The key to their effectiveness was aerial delivery of men and materiel into denied areas. The Royal Air Force provided this essential support through its “special duties” squadrons. The U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) assigned these missions to the 885th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy) (Special) in the Mediterranean, and to the 2641st Special Group operating from England.³

In the China-Burma-India theatre, a USAAF unit provided crucial support to Wingate’s Special Force (Second Chindit Expedition) operating in Northern Burma during 1944. Wingate’s “long-range penetration” force sought to create maximum disruption by exploiting Allied command of the air to

insert, sustain, support and exfiltrate large units behind Japanese lines. The 5318th Provisional Unit was created in August 1943 and commanded by Col. Philip G. Cochran. It was officially redesignated “1st Air Commando Group” on 29 March 1944. Employing a variety of aircraft (including gliders and helicopters), the group performed troop delivery, medical evacuation, strike, resupply and reconnaissance missions. Wingate’s operational concept was validated, but at the cost of appalling losses to the jungle and the enemy. Special Force was withdrawn from Burma, and Cochran’s group flew its last combat mission in May 1944. The 1st Air Commando Group was disbanded on 20 May 1944, having earned a Distinguished Unit Citation for action against the Japanese.⁴

Air Force special operations were revitalized for the Korean War by activation in 1950 of three special Air Resupply and Communications (ARC) wings under the Military Air Transport Service (MATS).⁵ ARC units supported unconventional

An Air Commando pilot poses with his B-26 during Exercise GOLDFIRE I (October–November 1965). (USAF Photo 175621)





Members of 1st Air Commando Group combat control team on maneuvers at the Special Air Warfare Center. (USAF Photo 168166)

operations by both the Army and the newly created (June 1948) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Missions included "introduction and evacuation of agents behind enemy lines, aerial resupply of guerrillas, support of commando-type operations and isolated Army units, printing and packaging of leaflets, and providing trained personnel capable of conducting psychological warfare through other media."⁶ Rescue of downed aircrews was a secondary mission.⁷

These missions soon embroiled the Air Force in a "jurisdictional dispute" between the CIA and the Army. Army advocates charged the Air Force with supporting CIA pretensions to a leadership role in planning and preparing to conduct unconventional warfare, and with using its support of CIA operations to lay "claim to a leading role" in that field. ARC wings bolstered the Air Force claim of "capability to support CIA activities during peacetime or wartime, to conduct overt psychological warfare, and to direct, coordinate, and support unconventional warfare operations." The Army believed its sister service sought "a unilateral, preeminent position among the military services for control and direction of wartime unconventional warfare activities." By contrast, the Army saw the Air Force role as "essentially a 'supply agency' . . ." Special air units should be developed to support unconventional and psychological warfare, "but not to duplicate the Army's capabilities, and certainly not to be used as a license to claim a dominant role in those fields."⁸

The Army role in unconventional warfare was strengthened by activation of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (SFGA) on 11 June 1952 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.⁹ Ironically, very few Special Forces personnel actually served in Korea. General MacArthur was disdainful of unconventional units and resisted all urgings from Fort Bragg until early 1953. Fifty-five officers and enlisted men from the 10th SFGA were deployed during March–May 1953, but were not used in their proper guerrilla warfare role.¹⁰ Nonetheless, Army SO fared better than its Air Force counterpart: the ARC

wings were downgraded to group status in 1953, then deactivated entirely in 1956.¹¹

The Army unconventional warfare establishment expanded slowly until the end of the decade. A second unit—77th (later 7th) SFGA—was activated in late 1953 and a third (1st SFGA) in 1957.¹² Unconventional warfare attained a highly favored status with the advent of the Kennedy Administration. President Kennedy's patronage sparked a dramatic increase in funding for, and therefore attention to, SO capabilities in all of the services. This support also initiated a reorientation away from guerrilla warfare sponsorship to counterinsurgency (COIN) as the predominant American interest in unconventional warfare. Added to this was civic action or "nation building." Kennedy sought to challenge and defeat Soviet-sponsored "wars of national liberation" in the Third World, with an immediate confrontation in Vietnam.¹³

The Army responded promptly: a 1960 reorganization plan made provision for a total of 24 Special Forces groups, and all but six of these were eventually activated. Twelve groups were activated in 1961: 5th (Regular Army), 16th, 19th, 20th and 21st (Army National Guard); and 2nd, 9th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 17th and 24th (Army Reserve). Three more SFGAs (3rd, 6th and 8th) were added during 1963, all in the Regular Army.¹⁴ It is noteworthy that most of this expansion took place in the Reserve Components.

The USAF also met Kennedy's challenge. In March 1961 the Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, ordered that a unit be created within the Tactical Air Command (TAC) to conduct COIN military assistance operations.¹⁵

The Air Force launched its current counterinsurgency program [on 14 April 1961] with the activation of the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron [JUNGLE JIM] at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Its mission, according to General LeMay's testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, included "counterinsurgency and unconventional and psychological warfare operations." The squadron was expanded into a group and later a wing, finally being incorporated in June 1963 as the 1st Air Commando Wing of the USAF Special Air Warfare Center.¹⁶

The SAW Center itself was activated on 27 April 1962. Hurlburt Field—situated on the sprawling Eglin Air Force Base (AFB) reservation in western Florida—was destined to become the permanent home of Air Force SAW forces, which adopted and popularized the name "Air Commando." Within HQUAFAF, SAW doctrine was supervised by the Special Warfare Division, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations. Under TAC operational command, SAW forces grew from 400 in April 1962 to nearly 8,000 in 1968. Elements included the SAW Center, SAW School, 1st Air Commando Wing (ACW), 1st Combat Applications Group (Eglin AFB), and the 4420th Combat Support Group (added July 1962). When 1st ACW relocated to England AFB, Louisiana, in January 1966, an additional unit—4410th Combat Crew Training Wing—was activated at Hurlburt Field.¹⁷ An overview of SAW components will provide useful background:

Counterinsurgency (COIN) involved joint action with other military services and United States government agencies to assist friendly nations in preventing the emergence of insurgency by helping friendly governments in "national civic action programs to solve the social and economic problems



Howard AFB, Panama Canal Zone, "Home of Detachment 3, 1st Air Commando Group" (later 605th Air Commando Squadron), 1962.
(USAF Photo KE 13618)



Survival training in the Panamanian jungle, with Choco Indian assisting, 1967.
(USAF Photo 108360)

upon which Communism feeds," and in maintaining or restoring internal security when faced with active insurgency. SAW forces provided "a rapid reaction force for a global operational capability, and train[ed] crew members to instruct allied forces in all phases of special operations." "The primary mission of the Air Commandos is not to fight the


insurgents, but to train and assist friendly forces in preventing and fighting insurgency. For its counterinsurgency tasks, the Wing has a variety of specialized aircraft, many of which are World War II bombers and fighters or training aircraft compatible with those possessed by developing countries." In fact, the initial aircraft complement consisted of 16 C-47s, eight B-26s and eight T-28s.¹⁸

Military Civic Action was addressed in terms of "aerospace civic-action modules" which are "increment[s] of U.S. or indigenous aerospace power useful in civic actions." The so-called "development modules" were designed to "promote and support orderly evolution of the country's aerospace posture," and embraced airways and airfield construction, support and training, and development of indigenous aircraft industry, weather and communications infrastructures. The "exploitation modules . . . contribute directly to the country's economic and social welfare (nation-building). . . ." Examples of services include agriculture, health, mapping and charting, surveys, educational television, air-sea rescue and space rescue, disaster assessment and relief, air police system, and remote area communications. Air Commandos might be used in these endeavors, but since the usual objective was "to strengthen and help stabilize the central government," doctrine preferred that "preponderantly indigenous military forces should be used."¹⁹

Psychological Operations (Psyops) aimed "to create worldwide attitudes and behavior consistent with U.S. policy and to influence foreign audiences to preserve and enhance the security of the United States." SAW units supported psyops

in a variety of ways: show of force, attack of selected targets to demonstrate futility of resistance, harassing actions, demonstrating military superiority via aerospace force maneuverability, leaflet and loudspeaker missions, humanitarian operations and support of civic action, and operational analysis. "In general the primary focus of psyops during COIN is winning the minds of the people to gain their support and loyalty." Once again, the primary role of SAW forces in COIN situations was to train and assist "indigenous air forces in the role and use of airpower in psyops." In unconventional warfare, "the major psychological operations effort . . . is to carry out leaflet drops and loudspeaker missions."²⁰

Tactical Air Operations consisting of close air support (CAS), air interdiction, assault airlift, and aerial reconnaissance. CAS embraced column cover, strike missions, escort missions, and aid in the defense of fortified hamlets and outposts. Air interdiction was "usually conducted against targets that reduce enemy capability to assemble and launch offensive actions," such as transportation and communication lines and staging areas. It also included "border or peripheral interdiction"



when insurgent forces "receive support from outside the native country," such as via the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Indochina. Assault airlift involved rapid movement and sustaining of ground assault forces. Tactical air reconnaissance included visual reconnaissance (area search, specific search, route reconnaissance, airborne artillery adjustment and direction of air strikes), photo reconnaissance, and electronic and infrared reconnaissance.²¹

The final SAW mission—unconventional warfare—will be reviewed later. SAW forces were soon given ample opportunity to practice their doctrine in a shooting war. Operations in Southeast Asia are beyond the scope of this paper, and in any event much information on the development and operational use of these units remains classified and is not available for release.²² However, a brief review is necessary to set the stage for Air National Guard aspects of the SAW program.

On 11 October 1961, President Kennedy approved deployment of an Air Commando unit to provide logistical support and training to the Republic of Vietnam Air Force (RVNAF). Detachment 2A (codenamed FARM GATE of the 4400th CCTS) deployed to Bien Hoa Air Base (AB), RVN, over the period 4 November–18 December 1961, taking eight T-28s, four SC-47s and four RB-26s, all in RVNAF markings. It was originally intended that the 151-man FARM GATE would simply train RVNAF pilots, but that force proved too small to adequately support Vietnamese Army operations, and FARM GATE personnel were "engaged in combat operations before the close of 1962." FARM GATE thus became the first USAF unit to conduct combat missions in the Vietnam War. The unit also flew forward air control missions to control CAS strikes. Until 1965, FARM GATE aircraft carried RVNAF markings even when flown exclusively by USAF pilots. American pilots were not authorized to conduct combat missions without a Vietnamese crew member, in which case a flight was considered a mission to train Vietnamese pilots, even if combat ordnance was delivered. FARM GATE was bolstered by the arrival of an additional five T-28s, 10 B-26s and two C-47s in January 1963. The detachment was inactivated in June 1963 with assets being absorbed by the 1st Air Commando Squadron (ACS), 34th Tactical Group. A second Air Commando squadron arrived in-country in October 1964. Air Commandos began defoliation (RANCH HAND) missions using modified C-130s as early as 1962, and played a key role in support of Military Assistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observation Group, a joint service unconventional warfare task force which carried out clandestine operations throughout Southeast Asia. Air Commandos also performed in a more overt role in Southeast Asia. Detachment 6 of 1st ACW deployed to Udorn AB, Thailand, in early 1964, and was replaced by the 606th ACS in 1966.²³

The global scope of SAW activity is evident in the following summary of 1st ACW 1968 dispersion:

- 605th ACS (Composite) at Howard AFB, Panama Canal

C-47 of the 14th Air Commando Wing on psyops leaflet mission over South Vietnam, 1966. (USAF Photo 98970)

605th Air Commando Squadron personnel use VHF radio to call in an air drop, Los Veros, Panama. (USAF Photo 108878)

A U-10 landing on a crude Panamanian airstrip during civic action operation. (Photo copied from *The National Guardsman*, Nov. 1964)

Zone, supporting the 8th SFGA and USAF Southern Command (USAFSO).


- 7th ACS (Composite) at Sembach AB, Federal Republic of Germany, supporting the 10th SFGA and USAF in Europe (USAFE).

- With the 14th ACW (7th Air Force) in RVN: 1st ACS (A-1E strike), 4th ACS (AC-47 strike), 5th ACS (C-47 and U-10 psyops and night flare illumination), 9th ACS (C-47 and O-2 psyops and night flare illumination), 20th Helicopter Squadron (CH-3C and UH-1F airlift—the sole COIN airlift helicopter squadron in the USAF at the time).²⁴

The Air National Guard (ANG) "got into this offbeat, highly specialized business [special warfare] as charter members, organizing four squadrons in 1955 with an unrevealing designation as 'Troop Carrier' Squadrons. This was before the Air Force itself reinstated the Commando mission. Outfitted from the Air Force's dwindling stock of [HU-16s], they plunged into the work of preparing themselves for unconventional warfare behind enemy lines. As Air Guard base support requirements took firmer shape, they expanded to the Group structure and finally, last year [1963], received public recognition of their *real* role with their redesignation as Air Commando Groups [emphasis in original]."²⁵

The National Guard Bureau (NGB) formally brought the ANG Troop Carrier Groups into the SAW program early in fiscal year 1964, redesignating them as Air Commando Groups: 129th (Hayward, California), 130th (Charleston, West Virginia), 135th (Middle River, Maryland), and 143rd (Providence, Rhode Island).²⁶ These groups were "TAC gained" and trained for unconventional warfare (UW) missions, primarily in support of the Green Berets. There were over 2,500 Special Forces personnel in the ARNG by 1963, distributed among three group headquarters and 13 companies. Not surprisingly, many of these units were components of the Maryland, West Virginia and Rhode Island ARNGs.²⁷ In terms of SAW doctrine, UW sought . . .

. . . to strengthen or create resistance to enemy authority among the people within enemy territory. Underground movements and guerrilla warfare (GW) stem from this resistance and are supported by organized elements of a disaffected population. Where resistance exists, guerrilla operations can be expected to flourish. . . . The effectiveness of these



operations is often strengthened by external support from sources that stand to gain politically and militarily from its success. External assistance in the form of logistic, psychological, or direct military aid and tactical support may be overt or clandestine.

UW missions harass and disrupt enemy communications, lines of supply, and transportation. Attacks are directed against his economic, industrial, political, and military structures. Intelligence is collected and friendly forces aided in evading capture, or if captured, to escape and return to friendly areas. UW operations may be conducted in limited, general, or cold-war conditions, in both defensive and offensive operations. In limited and general war, UW supports conventional forces; in cold war, it is conducted in support of insurgent and counterinsurgent forces.

Generally, an essential requirement for the conduct of UW is the ability of the sponsoring agency or country to provide external assistance by using airlift. Airlift aircraft introduce personnel, equipment, and supplies into enemy-dominated territory by air-drop or air-land and exfiltrate personnel as required. Such missions are normally conducted in a clandestine environment.²⁸

SAW aircraft and personnel were specially selected and trained to "develop a capability to provide the following kinds of air support for the UW mission":

1. Air-drop or air-land delivery of personnel, equipment, or supplies in support of guerrillas operating within enemy-dominated areas. Such missions use carefully planned ingress and egress tactics to avoid detection. Landing or drop zones are specially marked according to the mission environment.
2. Exfiltrate personnel from enemy-dominated territory by various techniques under a clandestine environment.
3. Provide airborne radio relay and communications surveillance of denied areas.
4. Conduct aerial visual and photographic reconnaissance of denied areas, emphasizing visual and photo sensors.
5. Provide close air support, interdiction, tactical air reconnaissance, and airlift support for Army Special Action Teams.
6. Provide loadmasters, dropmasters, and parachute-qualified combat control teams and forward air controllers.
7. Provide air-ground communications equipment compatible with that of the supported U.S. Army Special Forces.



8. Maintain crew and aircraft capability for short- and medium-range penetration of hostile territory, and for operations from austere landing strips and water areas.²⁹

To accomplish these missions, ANG Air Commando groups trained "in takeoffs and landings from unimproved runways or water, and in air-dropping of small groups." They were also used for search and rescue missions, and were equipped with varied aircraft: the 129th and 130th Groups flew C-119s, while the 135th and 143rd flew HU-16 amphibians.³⁰ As an indication of their high priority within the SAW structure, each ANG unit "received from new production six U-10B aircraft." But because of USAF combat needs in Southeast Asia, most of the new U-10Bs were removed from the ANG units in 1965 and replaced by U-6A utility aircraft until 1967, when the U-10s were returned.³¹

The 1st ACW placed heavy emphasis on training Latin American air forces in SAW techniques. Through USAFSO, personnel from 14 countries trained jointly with U.S. Army's 8th Special Action Force.³² The opportunity for ANG involvement was quickly exploited. When the full complement of 500 men from the WVARNG 135th AC Group (ACG) went to Howard AFB in three detachments for two weeks each during January–March 1965, the event was noted as "the first National Guard unit to deploy its entire manpower outside of the United States for annual active duty training." Working with the Regulars of the 605th ACS (Composite), the Guardsmen received flight training ("loudspeaker, techniques, leaflet drops, message pickups, Forward Air Controller techniques, aerial photography, and night infiltration and exfiltration missions"); performed low-level navigation, parabundle and free-fall drops, and personnel drops; went through accelerated courses in the USAF Tropical Survival School at Albrook AFB; qualified with "the new M16"; completed altitude chamber physiological training; and—for the U-10B pilots—practiced water takeoff and landing using the 605th's float-equipped U-10. They also assisted the Regulars with civic action projects, such as making medical flight to native villages.³³

Over the next few years, some 2,000 Air Commandos from all of the ANG Groups performed annual field training in Panama. The 130th ACG returned in January–February 1966, dropping soldiers of the 8th SFGA and 3rd Battalion (Airborne)—508th Infantry, and engaging in further civic action missions—medical flights and construction of a dirt airstrip for an isolated village. Some 135th personnel trained at Hurlburt Field that year.³⁴ The RIANG 143rd ACG deployed to Panama in January–February 1967, their HU-16Bs flying via Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, then on to the Canal Zone. The Rhode Islanders practiced dropping parabundles and troops, and made orientation flights to Costa Rica and Colombia.³⁵ As one report noted, these overseas trips were "a whole new concept in annual field training, an explosion of the Air Guard into the far corners of the world. . . ." "The importance of solid staff work is thoroughly understood by these Air Commando outfits; they are among the most traveled of all part-time troops, with experience during the past two years in Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Crete, England,

1st Air Commando Group airman wearing the "Aussie hat" trains with "the new AR-15" assault rifle at the Special Air Warfare Center, Hurlburt Field.
(USAF Photo 168165)



HU-16 of the West Virginia ANG 130th Air Resupply Squadron (later Air Commando Squadron) in flight over the state Capitol, 1957.
(USAF Photo 171848)

Belgium, Iceland, the Azores, Bermuda, Alaska, Guantanamo, Panama, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Colombia and other exotic locations.³⁶

Maryland's 135th ACG is representative of the ANG units. The 135th was activated on 10 September 1955 as an Air Resupply Squadron, and was originally based at Harbor Field in Baltimore—now the site of Dundalk Marine Terminal. In October 1958, the unit was redesignated Troop Carrier Squadron (Medium), and relocated to Glenn L. Martin State Airport in April 1960. The squadron became part of the 135th Troop Carrier Group on 12 January 1962.³⁷ A series of minor reorganizations occurred in the period immediately before the group's public movement into the SAW program. The 135th Tactical Hospital (Troop Carrier) was allotted to Maryland effective 5 May 1962, adding three officers and 14 airmen.³⁸ The 135th Materiel Squadron (MATRON) and 135th Combat Support Squadron were federally recognized, and 135th Tactical Dispensary was redesignated 135th USAF Dispensary, effective 9 February 1963. The entire group was ordered to Travis Field (Savannah Municipal Airport), Savannah, Georgia, for annual field training 13–27 July 1963.³⁹

Via CNGB (NG-AFOTM) letter "Redesignation of Troop Carrier Groups" (24 June 1963), the NGB directed that the 135th Troop Carrier Group and Squadron be redesignated 135th Air Commando Group and Squadron effective 1 July 1963. The applicable Unit Manning Documents (UMD) were changed from R2124MC to R1664MC, and from R2125MC to R1665MC, respectively.⁴⁰

SAW training intensified coincident with unit redesignation. Major Warren G. Schutte, Flight Training Instructor with Group Headquarters, was ordered to Hurlburt Field on temporary duty 11–13 June to attend the SAWC "Demonstrations and Conference." Schutte, Capt. Robert D. Cardwell, Jr. (135th ACS), and Tech. Sgt. George J. Porter (135th MATRON) were sent to SAWC on 17 June for the two-week

Phase I aircrew training in U-10B aircraft. A month later, Capt. Cardwell—training with the 135th ACS at Travis Field—was sent to Hurlburt Field then on to Greenwood, South Carolina, to participate in U.S. Strike Command Exercise SWIFT STRIKE III.⁴¹

The scope of 135th ACG operations was illustrated by a 1964 article in *The National Guardsman*:

"In several years of SWIFT STRIKE and its predecessor, PINE CONE, Guard Air Commandos have plopped down repeatedly on South Carolina waterways in the midnight darkness to deliver or pick up beret-wearing teams from the Regulars at Ft. Bragg or from the Alabama Army Guard's 20th Special Forces Group. So far this year, Maryland crews have made two trips to Alabama to help the same unit catch up on both water training and parachute delivery, getting some training for themselves in the process. At home, in Baltimore, they've worked just as closely with their own local Guard Special Forces Company [Company B, 16th SFGA], providing planes from which the Guardsmen can make their quarterly qualifying jumps onto small-town airports. . . ."⁴²

The 135th had been using a section of the Patuxent River Naval Air Test Center's water area for amphibious training, but was locked out when the Navy closed the section on weekends, the unit's only flying time. As a result, the 135th focused on bringing pilots "up to the 100-landing minimum, for full qualification" during 20 June–4 July 1964 AFT at the ANG Permanent Field Training Site, Gulfport, Mississippi, Municipal Airport (since redesignated 8213th Combat Readiness Training Center). In addition to practice landings at nearby Pensacola Naval Air Station, the 135th's HU-16s and U-10s resupplied guerrillas in a "SAWC-sponsored mock war in a four-state area" around Eglin AFB.⁴³

The Maryland Air Commandos decided to expand its amphibious training by conducting exfiltration exercises with their old friends, the Alabama Green Berets. On Sunday morning, 28 June, two HU-16s took off from the airstrip at Alexandria City (northeast of Montgomery) and flew to Lake Martin. The amphibians landed in turn, picked up soldiers

from small outboard motorboats, then lifted off within a matter of seconds and flew direct to a nearby drop zone to paradrop crates of rations to other Special Forces troops. The pilots then flew to Alexandria City, dropped off their passengers, and made the circuit twice more. This exercise was noteworthy for its opportunity to train in a specific mission activity, and required aircrews to fly to demanding height and speed constraints, navigated by map, compass and landmark without use of electronic aids, land on the water at almost exactly 75 knots between two inner tubes marking off expedient "seadrome." By Sunday noon the operation was over and crews flew back to Gulfport to resume routine training.⁴⁴

Reorganization occurred fairly frequently for the 135th ACG. A major realignment of the entire group was effective 1 May 1964 (see Table 1). At the same time (albeit retroactively a year later!), the 135th USAF Dispensary was redesignated 135th Tactical Dispensary (Air Commando).⁴⁵ The NGB directed that the 135th MATRON (AC) be inactivated effective 19 November 1965, and that personnel be reassigned to two newly activated units—135th Supply Squadron (AC) and 135th Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron (AC), the latter euphoniously shortened to CAMRON. Activation, inactivation and realignment of 135th Air Commando Group units was effective 20 November, with federal recognition of the new Supply Squadron and CAMRON coming the same day. Authorized strength of the new units is shown in Table 2. Actual strengths at this time were 59 (five officers, 54 airmen) in the Supply Squadron and 130 (three officers, 127 airmen) in the CAMRON.⁴⁶

To implement the "single manager" concept in the area of Base Communications, the NGB directed that the Communications Branch within each Combat Support Squadron (CSS) be withdrawn and separate Communications Flights (Support) be established. These flights were Air Force Communications Service-gained and colocated with the group they supported. Two officers and 27 airmen slots were accordingly withdrawn from the 135th CSS (AC) effective 8 June 1966 and assigned to 135th Communications Flight (Support). The flight was federally recognized the same day.⁴⁷

In that same month, the NGB issued draft UMDS revisions

for ANG Air Commando units, which were implemented in August (see Table 3). UMDs provide a valuable picture of ANG SAW units, and are summarized below. Part I gave a unit's official designation, and explains its function and capabilities, while Part II contained a detailed listing of authorized manpower and skills.

ANG UMD R1666MC (1 June 1966), Headquarters Air Commando Group—A Group Headquarters provided "command and staff supervision for assigned units in Flying Safety, Operations and Materiel functional areas. Provides command support to assigned units in all other functional areas." Its capabilities: "Command and supervision of assigned units." Under a colonel, 28 officers and 27 airmen performed a variety of staff functions: flying safety, ground safety, logistics/materiel, operations (plans, training, standardization/evaluation, and control), intelligence collection and processing, and operation of synthetic trainers.


ANG UMD R1667MC (1 June 1966), Air Commando Squadron—An Air Commando Squadron provided "training to air crews and supports personnel engaged in counterinsurgency." It was capable of employing "one squadron of eight HU-16 or C-119 and six U-10" aircraft. Flying crews were required to maintain a "monthly flying rate of 140 hours per month per aircraft." HU-16 or C-119 crews comprised two Troop Carrier Pilots and one each Navigator, Airborne Radio Operator, Flight Mechanic and Aircraft Loadmaster, while U-10As were crewed by a single Transport Pilot. Of the squadron's 100 personnel, 68 were assigned as aircraft crew. The commander (lieutenant colonel) led a small operations staff, and the remainder provided terminal services (radio operation and repair, weapons and munitions handling, personal survival equipment, and logistics support). The squadron was authorized a total of 43 officers and 57 airmen.

ANG UMD R5027MC (1 June 1966), Combat Support Squadron—A Combat Support Squadron—by far the largest group component—"operates and maintains [an] installation or facility in support of dispersed, en route or on base mission, maintenance, medical and headquarters units." It was capable of providing "base services in support of EWP mission of on base weapons systems and allied units." A lieutenant colonel directed 27 officers and 257 airmen engaged in a wide variety of functions: legal, chaplain, information, financial management, administration, procurement, personnel and training, audio-visual support, data automation, motor pool, traffic management, facilities management, food service, trades and crafts, security police (law enforcement and weapons system security) and fire fighting/crash rescue.

ANG UMD R4687MC (1 June 1966), Supply Squadron—A Supply Squadron (AC)—commanded by a lieutenant colonel—"for the receipt, storage, and issuance of all classes of supplies, except medical, sales store, commissary store and salvage and disposal." It was tailored "for the employment and support of an Air Commando Squadron." The nine officers and 96 airmen performed inventory, issue, warehousing, personal equipment, and equipment and fuel management functions.

Detail of MDANG HU-16.

(Photo Courtesy Grumman Corporation)





Lt. Col. Donald C. Utermahlen (Operations Officer, 135th Air Commando Group) confers with officers of the Maryland ARNG's Company B, 16th SFGA, circa 1964 or 1965. (Photo from Author's Collection)

ANG UMD R4737MC (1 June 1966), Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadron—A CAMRON consisted of six officers and 157 airmen commanded by a lieutenant colonel. The squadron's function included "organization and field maintenance of airframes, engines, and allied maintenance; electronic systems and equipment." It was capable of supporting "the assigned weapon system of one Air Commando Squadron with a UE [unit equipment] of eight HU-16 or C-119 and six U-10 aircraft." This included maintenance on "unit mission aircraft and support equipment," support aircraft and "transient aircraft when mission/support aircraft have similar systems." The squadron performed quality control, maintenance scheduling and control, materiel control, training/standardization, maintenance records analysis, airframe repair, survival equipment maintenance, reciprocating engine and propeller maintenance, fuel, electrical, pneudraulics, instrument, radio, radar, ground equipment, weapons, and organizational maintenance functions.

ANG UMD R4768MC (1 June 1966), Tactical Dispensary—The Tactical Dispensary provided "medical support to mission squadron and allied units under field or combat conditions." It could provide "limited diagnostic and therapeutic services in the fields of general and aviation medicine," limited dental and emergency or minor surgery. Under the command of a major were seven officers (doctors, dentists, nurses and medical administrators) and 16 technicians.⁴⁸

Minor changes occurred in 1967 and early 1968, and the Group Headquarters and Air Commando Squadron were redesignated "Special Operations" effective 8 August 1968. Simultaneously, the NGB changed UMD designation codes for SO to R182MX.⁴⁹ Another realignment to implement new UMDs was initially scheduled for 16 December 1968 but delayed until 2 January 1969 (see Table 4).⁵⁰ In October 1969, a Civil Engineering Flight (UMD R4628MC) was created by transfer of personnel from the 135th CSS to Group Headquarters. The new flight was mustered effective 28 October

with three officers and 64 airmen.⁵¹

A substantial reduction in Special Forces strength had begun in 1966, when six ARNG and USAR SFGAs were inactivated. Inactivation of Regular Army groups started in December 1969, and by June 1974 only three groups (5th, 7th and 10th) remained. The Air Force followed the Army lead, eventually (1 July 1974) inactivating the Special Operations Center itself. And, on 14 June 1971, the MDANG's 135th SOG was converted to a Tactical Air Support Group—the first of the ANG SO units to be removed from the SAW program. (The 135th acquired its present Tactical Airlift Group designation on 1 April 1977.) In May 1975, the 129th SOG (CAANG) was converted to an Aerospace Recovery and Rescue Group. Five months later, the 130th (WVANG) and 143rd (RIANG) were both redesignated as Tactical Air Support Groups, so that by the end of October 1975 none of the original ANG SAW units remained.⁵³

The Carter Administration had planned even deeper cuts, but President Reagan reversed the trend by reaffirming SO as a national policy instrument. He also demonstrated a willingness to use SO forces in politically sensitive areas, such as assisting the Salvadoran military and battling terrorism. SO units participated in the Grenada and Panama operations.⁵⁴


Within the USAF, SO reemerged under the Military Airlift Command's 23rd Air Force, activated at Scott AFB, Illinois, on 1 March 1983 to control SO, weather reconnaissance, aero-medical airlift, and combat rescue units. Effective 22 May 1990, 23rd Air Force SO units were absorbed into the newly activated U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command (USAFSOC), a separate major air command reporting directly to the Air Force Chief of Staff. Principal subordinate units include:

- **At Hurlburt Field:** Headquarters, 1st SOW (with 8th, 9th, 16th, 20th and 55th SOS), 1720th Special Tactics Group (with 1723rd and 1724th Special Tactics Squadrons), and USAF Special Operations School.
- **At Rhein-Main AB, Federal Republic of Germany:** 39th SOW, with 7th, 21st and 67th SOS (the latter two based at RAF Woodbridge in England).
- **At Clark AB, Republic of the Philippines:** 353rd SOW, with 1st, 31st and 17th SOS (the latter based at Kadena AB, Okinawa).

SO is also well represented in the Reserve Components. The Air Force Reserve includes 919th SOG (with 711th SOS) at Duke Field, Eglin AFB, and 71st SOS at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. The Pennsylvania ANG includes the 193rd SOG based at Harrisburg International Airport. Both the ANG and Air Force Reserve units are USAFSOC-gained upon mobilization.⁵⁵

SO is now recognized as a vital national asset. The Department of Defense established a Joint Special Operations Command in early 1984 to coordinate activities of Army, Navy (SEAL) and Air Force special warfare units. But even greater centralization was mandated by the 99th Congress, which passed a law directing creation of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, and a new unified command under a four-star general. The new organization—the U.S. Special Operations Command—was activated on 16 April 1987, with headquarters at MacDill, AFB, Florida.⁵⁶ □

MDANG HU-16. (Photo Courtesy Grumman Corporation)

**Table 1: Organization of 135th ACG, May 1964**
(GO 4, 22 Apr 1964)

	AMG UMD	OFF	AMN	TOT
From HQ 135th ACG	R2124MC	21	19	40
To Group Headquarters	R1664MC	32	28	60
From 135th Air Commando Squadron	R2125MC	42	57	99
To 135th Air Commando Squadron	R1665MC	37	50	87
From 135th Combat Support Squadron (TC)	R5025MC	29	256	285
To 135th Combat Support Squadron (AC)	R5025MC	31	284	315
From 135th Materiel Squadron (TC)	R4655MC	13	212	225
To 135th Materiel Squadron (AC)	R4655MC	13	244	257
From 135th USAF Dispensary (TC)	R4759MC	8	16	24
To 135th Tactical Dispensary (AC)	R4769MC	8	16	24
From Total		113	560	673
To Total		121	622	743

Table 2: Organization of 135th ACG, November 1965
(GO 23, 16 Nov 1965)

	AMG UMD	OFF	AMN	TOT
Group Headquarters	R1664MC	29	25	54
135th Air Commando Squadron	R1665MC	37	50	87
135th Combat Support Squadron (AC)	R5025MC	31	284	315
135th Tactical Dispensary (AC)	R4769MC	8	16	24
135th Supply Squadron (AC)	R4685MC	8	91	99
135th CAMRON (AC)	R4735MC	8	156	164
Total		121	622	743

Table 3: Organization of 135th ACG, August 1966
(GO 19, 8 Aug 1966)

	AMG UMD	OFF	AMN	TOT
From HQ 135th ACG	R1664MC	29	25	54
To Group Headquarters	R1666MC	29	25	54
From 135th Air Commando Squadron	R1665MC	37	50	87
To 135th Air Commando Squadron	R1667MC	43	57	100
From 135th Combat Support Squadron	R5025MC	30	256	286
To 135th Combat Support Squadron	R5027MC	28	257	285
From 135th CAMRON	R4735MC	8	156	164
To 135th CAMRON	R4737MC	6	159	165
From 135th Supply Squadron	R4685MC	8	91	99
To 135th Supply Squadron	R4687MC	9	96	105
From 135th Tactical Dispensary	R4769MC	8	16	24
To 135th Tactical Dispensary	R4768MC	8	16	24
From Total		120	594	714
To Total		123	610	733

Table 4: Organization of 135th SOG, January 1969
(GO 22, 30 Dec 1968)

	AMG UMD	OFF	AMN	TOT
Group Headquarters	R1826MC	30	31	61
135th Special Operations Squadron	R1827MC	43	60	103
135th Combat Support Squadron	R5027MC	27	261	288
135th Tactical Dispensary	R4768MC	8	16	24
135th Supply Squadron	R4687MC	9	91	100
135th CAMRON	R4737MC	6	151	157
Total		123	610	733

Table 5: Annual Field Training, 135th AC/SO Group, 1964-1970
(GO 9, 2 Jun 64; GO 15, 30 Jun 65; GO 18, 12 Jul 66; GO 9, 15 May 67; GO 12, 12 Jun 68; GO 5, 8 Mar 69; GO 6, 1 Apr 70)

Training Period	Training Site(s)	Units Involved
20 June-4 July 1964	ANG Permanent Field Training Site, Gulfport Municipal Airport, Gulfport, MS*	HQ MDANG (part), Gp HQ, 135th ACS, 135 MATRON, 135 CSS, 135 Tac Disp
1 July-2 October 1965	Martin State Airport, Middle River, MD and Sembach AB, FRG	Same
29 July-28 August 1966	Howard AFB, Canal Zone and England AFB, LA	HQ MDANG (part), Gp HQ, HQ, 135 ACS, 135 CAMRON, 135 Supply Sq, 135 CSS, 135 Commo Flt (Sep)
10-24 June 1967	Travis Field (Savannah Municipal Airport), Savannah, GA	Same
20 July-3 August 1968	Otis AFB, MA	Same
14-28 June 1969	Otis AFB, MA	Same
18 July-1 August 1970	Marana Air Park, AZ	Same

*Now 8213th Combat Readiness Training Center

NOTES

1. Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Monro MacCloskey, *Alert the Fifth Force: Counterinsurgency, Unconventional Warfare, and Psychological Operations of the United States Air Force in Special Air Warfare* (New York, 1969), p. 188 (cited hereafter as MacCloskey, *Alert the Fifth Force*).
2. Lt. Col. Michael F. Noone, Jr., "Those Magnificent Air Commandos in Their Flying Machines," *Aerospace Historian* 17 (Winter-Fall 1970), pp. 72-75.
3. MacCloskey, *Alert the Fifth Force*, pp. 111-120; "United States Air Force Special Operations Forces" (Oct 1988), 2 pp. typescript, p. 1 (cited hereafter as "USAFSOF"), copy provided to author by Public Affairs Office, 23d AF-1st SOW on 14 Oct 1988.
4. Capt. W.J. Sciutti (III), "The First Air Commando Group, August 1943-May 1944," *American Aviation Historical Society Journal* 13 (Fall 1968), pp. 178-185

- (cited hereafter as *AAHS Journal*); 23d AF History Office, "Air Force Special Operations Forces" (N.D. [1988]), 5 pp. typescript, p. 1 (cited hereafter as "AFSOF"); Otto Heilbrunn, *Warfare in the Enemy's Rear* (New York, 1963), pp. 39, 82-93; MacCloskey, *Alert the Fifth Force*, pp. 104-108.
5. "AFSOF," pp. 1-2.
 6. Col. Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., *U.S. Army Special Warfare—Its Origins: Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952* (Washington, 1982), p. 134.
 7. "AFSOF," pp. 1-2; Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953*, rev. ed. (Washington, 1983), p. 581. The only mention of an ARC wing in this official USAF history is in conjunction with a review of air/sea rescue operations. Futrell states that H-19 helicopters (Dec 1952) and SA-16 amphibians (Mar 1953) were reassigned to 5th Air Force from the 581st ARC, based in the Philippines. "These 581st Wing planes were supposed to fly covert missions, but they also helped with rescue work."
 8. Paddock, pp. 134-135.
 9. John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, *Infantry, Part I: Regular Army, Army Lineage Series*, rev. ed. (Washington, 1972), p. 908.
 10. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, 1986), p. 102. For a general discussion of covert operations in Korea, see Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York, 1987), pp. 243-252.
 11. "AFSOF," pp. 1-2.
 12. Mahon and Danysh, p. 902.
 13. Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (New York, 1973), pp. 445, 450, 456-457, 460; Douglas S. Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present* (New York, 1977), pp. 18, 52-88.
 14. Mahon and Danysh, pp. 894-906, 904-906, 910-918.
 15. "AFSOF," p. 2.
 16. MacCloskey, *Alert the Fifth Force*, pp. 148, 149; Carl Berger (ed.), *The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973* (Washington, 1977), p. 11.
 17. Capt. Ronald H. Williams, "TAC's Special Centers," *The Navigator* (Air Training Command) 15 (Summer 1968), p. 9; "AFSOF," p. 2; Berger, p. 302; MacCloskey, p. 148-158.
 18. Williams, p. 2; "AFSOF," p. 2.
 19. MacCloskey, *Alert the Fifth Force*, pp. 136-139.
 20. *Ibid.*, pp. 132-136.
 21. *Ibid.*, pp. 139-147.
 22. Capt. George Cully, Chief, Inquiries Branch, Research Division, USAF Historical Research Center to author, 14 July 1988.
 23. Berger, pp. 11-13, 19, 122, 292; Gen. William M. Momyer, *Airpower in Three Wars* (Washington, 1978), pp. 11, 17 (note), 67, 226-271; Kevin Generous, "Irregular Forces in Vietnam," in John S. Bowman (ed.), *The Vietnam War: An Almanac* (New York, 1985), pp. 452, 453, 464; Shelby L. Stanton, *Vietnam Order of Battle* (Washington, 1981), p. 251-283.
 24. MacCloskey, *Alert the Fifth Force*, pp. 158-163.
 25. Major W.D. McGlasson, "Jungle and Rice-Paddy Air Force!," *The National Guardsman* 18 (Nov 1964), p. 6. The author confirmed the 135th's early involvement in SAW with Col. Vernon A. Sevier in a 31 May 1990 telecon. Sevier, current CO of the 135th TAG, joined the unit in April 1959 and states that the unit had been working with Special Forces for years.
 26. MacCloskey, *Alert the Fifth Force*, p. 158; Rene Francillon, *The Air Guard* (Aerofax, Inc., Austin, TX: n.d. [1983?]), p. 105, 106, 109, 115; Depts. of the Army and Air Force, National Guard Bureau (NGB), *Annual Review, 1964* (Washington, 1965), p. 63 (hereafter *NGB Annual Review*).
 27. Merle T. Cole, *Free State Green Berets—A History of Special Forces Units in the Maryland Army National Guard* (Crownsville, MD, 1988), p. 5. Prior to 1960 the ANG was supervised by the Continental Air Command, even though ANG units would be controlled by other air commands upon mobilization. The "gaining command" concept was adopted in 1960 "to streamline the procedures under which [ANG] units would be mobilized in an emergency and to bring the Air Guard elements into closer working relationships with the Air Force commands under which they would perform upon mobilization." Peacetime training supervision was thus transferred to the "gaining command." Major James C. Elliott, *The Modern Army and Air National Guard* (Princeton, NJ, 1965), pp. 103, 104.
 28. MacCloskey, *Alert the Fifth Force*, p. 131.
 29. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
 30. *Ibid.*, p. 158. The HU-16 was "the only amphibian to have served as mission aircraft in the ANG. . . ." Francillon, p. 161.
 31. *NGB Annual Review*, p. 70; Francillon, p. 161.
 32. MacCloskey, *The United States Air Force* (New York, 1967), pp. 119, 120, 189. A Special Action Force was a specially trained, area-oriented and partially language-qualified COIN team, built around an SFGA and augmented by attachment of psychological operations, civil affairs, intelligence, medical, engineering, military police and signals security units. SAFs could be readily deployed either to assist with internal defense planning or to combat an actual insurgency. Eventually five SAFs were formed, involving all SFGAs except the 5th (targeted for Vietnam) and 7th (strategic reserve), both at Fort Bragg. Joe Wagner, "Army Special Forces: Step Child or Child Prodigy?", *Armed Forces Management* 12 (May 1966), pp. 56, 59.
 33. Donald W. Coble, "They Called It 'Highland Fling,'" *The National Guardsman* 19 (June 1965), pp. 8-12. According to McGlasson (p. 48), the Panamanian AFT was scheduled "as a supplement to the Commando-type education [Air Guardsmen have] received through several years of participation in Strike Command's annual exercises in the Carolinas, SWIFT STRIKE."
 34. "Good Neighbor Guardsmen," *The National Guardsman* 20 (April 1966), pp. 26, 27.
 35. Lt. Col. Frank Martineau, "Yankees, Don't Go Home," *The National Guardsman* 21 (May 1967), pp. 18-20.
 36. *Ibid.*, pp. 18, 19.
 37. Francillon, p. 109.
 38. Ltr, CNGB (NG-AFOTM), 20 April 1962, subj: Constitution and Allotment of a Tactical Hospital, Maryland Air National Guard, in MD Military Dept. Archives, 5th Regiment Armory, Baltimore, file "Manning Records—135th Units, 1962-1966" (hereafter "Archives").
 39. General Orders No. 5 (20 May 1963), 9 (16 Jun 1963), and 10 (10 Jul 1963), Dept. of Militia, General Orders, 1962-, MD Document Collection, Pamphlet Box, MD Dept., Enoch Pratt Free Library, Baltimore (hereafter "GO" by number and date).
 40. GO 10 (10 July 1963).
 41. Special Orders (SO) No. 113 (10 Jun 1963), 117 (14 June 1963), 124 (25 Jun 1963) and 137 (16 Jul 1963), MD, Military Dept., State Personnel Office. *Special Orders, Military Dept., State of Maryland, Vol. 1, 2 Jan.-28 June 1963* and Vol. 2, 1 July-31 Dec. 1963.
 42. McGlasson, p. 48.
 43. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
 44. *Ibid.*, p. 3, 6.
 45. GO 4 (22 Apr 1964) and 4 (1 Apr 1965).
 46. GO 23 (16 Nov 1965) and 24 (6 Dec 1965).
 47. GO 17 (8 Jun 1966) and 24 (14 Oct 1966).
 48. GO 19 (8 Aug 1966); Ltr, CNGB (NG-AFOTM), 13 Jun 1966, subj: Reorganization/Realignment of ANG Air Commando and Air Refueling Units, in Archives.
 49. Flight Simulators/Synthetics function transferred from CAMRON to Group Headquarters via GO 5 (19 Apr 1967), while public information moved from CSS to Group HQ and personal equipment from Supply Squadron to the ACS via GO 9 (28 May 1968). The SO designation came via GO 14 (24 Jul 1968).
 50. GO 22 (30 Dec 1968); Ltrs, CNGB (NG-AFOTM), 29 Nov and 26 Dec 1968, subj: Reorganization/Realignment of Special Operations Units, in Archives.
 51. The flight's functions included engineering design and construction, work control, structures and pavement maintenance, trades and crafts, and fire protection/crash rescue. The flight was affected by a new UMD (CEG8MC) issued in March 1970. This UMD had two strength columns, reflecting two possible missions: a mobile engineering mission (Prime Beef C Team) with one officer and 59 men, and an augmentation of three officers and 22 men "to fulfill a typical Civil Engineering Flight mission requirement." GO 14 (24 Oct 1969). See also NGB Form 113a, Report of Inspection for Federal Recognition, 135th Civil Engr Flt, and the following letters: CNGB (NGANGOM), 3 Sep and 14 Oct 1969, subj: Activation of ANG Civil Engineering Flights; HQMDANG (CS), 28 Oct 1969, subj: Activation & Organization of 135th Civil Engineering Flight; and CNGB (NGANGOM), 23 Mar 1970, Realignment of Civil Engineering Flights, in Archives.
 52. GO 11 (2 Jun 1965), 1 (1 Jan 1966), 2 (17 Feb 1970) and 3 (24 Feb 1970).
 53. Ironically, MDARNG SF expanded to reinforced battalion strength during the 1970s (Cole, p. 8). Ltr, NGB-DOM, 28 May 1971; subj: Activation, Inactivation and Redesignation of Maryland Air National Guard Units, in Archives. Conversion was implemented via GO 13 (3 Jun 1971). See also "USAFSOF," p. 2; Francillon, pp. 105, 106, 109, 115. The 135th had just replaced its U-10Bs with O-2As in the spring of 1971. The 135th saw no federal active duty, but was called to state active duty in Baltimore during riots following the King assassination (April 1968) and in College Park during student riots after the Cambodian incursion (May 1970). Telecon, Col. Sevier, 25 Apr 1990.
 54. "AFSOF," p. 4; Blaufarb, pp. 288, 299-301; Simpson, pp. 217-8; Bill Yenne, *The History of the US Air Force* (New York, 1984), p. 190; Lt. Col. John R. Galvin, "Special Forces at the Crossroads," *Army* 23 (Dec 1973), pp. 21-4; Major David C. Schlachter and Major Fred J. Stubbs, "Special Operations Forces: Not Applicable?", *Military Review* 58 (Feb 1978), pp. 15-26; Tidal W. McCoy and Sven Kraemer, "The Department of Defense," in Charles L. Heatherly (ed.), *Mandate for Leadership: Policy Management in a Conservative Administration* (Washington, 1981), p. 107; Theodore Shackley, *The Third Option: An American View of Counterinsurgency Operations* (New York, 1981).
 55. "Brief History, Twenty-Third Air Force, 1983-1988" (Jul 1988), copy provided to author by Public Affairs Office, 23d AF-1st SOW on 14 Oct 1988; "USAFSOF," p. 2; Public Affairs Office, 834th ABW, 7 Jun 1990. The 193d was originally designated Tactical Electronic Warfare Group (TEWG), and flew combat operations out of Korat AB, Thailand, during the Vietnam War. Francillon, p. 147. The 193d now flies EC-130E VOLANT SOLO II psyops broadcast aircraft, and participated in the 1989-1990 Panamanian contingency.
 56. "Special Forces: Can They Do the Job?," *U.S. News and World Report* 101 (3 Nov 1986), pp. 36-42, 47; Public Info. Office, U.S. Special Operations Command, 7 Jul 1987.

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